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This article reflects critically on the impacts of the recent ban on artisanal and small-scale mining 
(ASM) – low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing – in Ghana.   Government 
officials claimed that a ban was necessary because the country’s ASM activities, most of which are 
found in the informal economy, pose a serious threat to local waterbodies and that security forces 
were needed for its enforcement.  It is argued here, however, that projecting the ban and associated 
military intervention as actions taken specifically to protect the environment has helped the 
government escape scrutiny over its choice of strategy to combat illegal mining.  Perhaps more 
importantly, it has masked what may be the real reasons behind these moves: 1) to help the 
government regain control of the purchasing side of an ASM sector that is now heavily populated and 
influenced by foreigners; and 2) to put it in an improved position to demarcate parcels of land to the 
multinational mineral exploration and mining companies that supply it with significant quantities of 
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1. Introduction and Background 
 
On 1 August 2017, the Government of Ghana launched Operation Vanguard, an exercise designed 
specifically to eradicate all unlicensed artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)1 activity in the country.  
A military intervention involving 400 men drawn from the Ghana Armed Forces, Ghana Air Force, 
Ghana Navy and the Ghana Police Force, and featuring tanks and other army vehicles, Operation 
Vanguard was initiated by Mr John Peter Amewu, Ghana’s Minister of Lands and Natural Resources 
at the time, and endorsed by the country’s newly-elected president, the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) 
Mr Nana Akufo-Addo.  After a brief period of training in the country capital of Accra, the recruits 
gathered at the Burma Camp, the headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence.  
Here, following briefings from key ministers, they boarded military vehicles with ‘Operation Vanguard’ 
etched on to their doors and hoods, and were dispatched to the Ashanti Region, Western Region and 
Eastern Region, the locations of the highest concentrations of informal ASM activity – popularly 
referred to as galamsey2 – in the country. 
 
The move to ban ASM and use of force to administer it were surprising decisions when considering 
that Ghana has always been seen as a trailblazer in the context of ASM formalization and where 
policymakers have consistently piloted and pursued new strategies to support the sector’s operators 
(Davidson, 1993; ILO, 1999; Hentschel et al., 2002).  These decisions were also made at a time when 
other governments in sub-Saharan Africa appeared to be doing precisely the opposite: considering 
ways to feature ASM more prominently in national economic development plans, and identifying 
creative ways of bringing operators into the legal domain.  But rather than committing resources to 
pursue either task, the Government of Ghana elected to fortify Operation Vanguard throughout, even 
after it had emerged that the exercise was linked to numerous human rights abuses and had left a trail 
of destruction in many rural communities.  Operation Vanguard may have also heavily undermined 
important work carried out in the country to formalize ASM. 
 
The bedrock for Operation Vanguard was laid in May 2013 during the presidential tenure of the 
National Democratic Congress’s (NDC) Mr John Mahama, only months after his own re-election to 
office.  Mr Mahama hastily assembled a five-member Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Illegal Small-
Scale Mining, which would work closely with the Ghana Armed Forces and Ghana Police in the months 
that followed ‘to arrest and prosecute Ghanaians and foreigners engaged in illegal mining’.5  Mr 
Mahama was forced to soften his stance, however, following numerous allegations of the soldiers and 
police dispatched to communities having abused many galamsey operators, looted gold and 
maliciously destroyed mine equipment, footage of which was captured on video and later shown on 
national television.3  Moreover, the Mahama Government appeared to recognize, shortly after 
commissioning these military ‘sweeps’ of communities, that banning ASM, an income-earning activity 
that employs at least one million Ghanaians directly and which has created millions of additional 
income-earning opportunities in the upstream and downstream industries it has spawned (Hilson et 
al., 2014), was not in its best interest, and that using force to do so was both unsustainable and 
impractical.   
 
 
1 Defined here as low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing. 
2 Galamsey is label used locally for informal ASM, the literal translation of which is ‘gather them and sell’. 
5 ‘Mahama inaugurates committee to deal with illegal mining menace’, 
www.ghanamma.com/2013/05/15/mahama-inaugurates-committee-to-deal-with-illegal-mining-menace/ 
(Accessed 13 October 2017). 
3 ‘Investigate the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Small-Scale Mining – ASM Africa Network’, 




The current government has adopted an even more hard-line stance toward galamsey operators, 
dismissing the problems encountered by its predecessor, and ignoring the flurry of calls to take stock 
of the economic importance of ASM, and to support and formalize the sector’s activities.  This was a 
surprising development given how Mr Akufo-Addo made a point to target galamsey communities 
during his electoral campaign.  In July 2016, he delivered a particularly memorable and passionate 
speech in Obuasi, long a galamsey ‘hot spot’, where he assured residents, only months before the 
election, that if sworn in as president he would formalize ASM activities. He even went as far as 
condemning his adversary for failing to do so: 
 
I was here in Obuasi to say that Galamsey, which I prefer to call small-scale mining, will be 
regularized, to ensure that the youth all find work to do. Shortly afterwards, Mahama also came 
here to tell you that I was lying, and that an Akufo-Addo government will rather sack everyone 
involved in galamsey…When he [John Mahama] won the election [in 2012], he rather directed 
soldiers to come and drive out all persons involved in galamsey in Obuasi.4 
 
But only months after being sworn in as president, Mr Akufo-Addo would backtrack on these promises 
by hastily resurrecting the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Illegal Small-Scale Mining that had gone 
dormant during the last two years of Mr Mahama’s presidency.  He declared, publicly, and to the 
surprise of many, that he was ‘prepared to put my Presidency on the line on this matter [i.e. the 
galamsey issue]’.5  Drawing inspiration from the president’s backing and the rallying calls of the 
Taskforce’s new Chairman, Professor Frimpong Boateng, Mr Amewu himself announced that the 
‘government intends to sustain its fight against illegal mining by using the military to ensure that 
the culprits do not return to the site when the reclamation program begins’, furthermore insisting that 
it ‘intends to use this approach for at least a year’.6  He used Operation Vanguard as a vehicle to target 
galamsey activities and, in a bid to – in his words – ‘sanitize’ the sector, simultaneously suspended all 
legal ASM activities and put a freeze on new licenses.  When the case for formalizing and supporting 
ASM in a country as poverty-stricken as Ghana is considered, however, these moves were unjustifiable 
economically and developmentally.  
 
The purpose of this article is to reflect further on the impacts of the ban, which was officially lifted in 
December 2018, and more broadly, the Government of Ghana’s decision to use force to eradicate 
informal mining in the country and to suspend all licensed activities.  Fuelled by the frenzy generated 
by #StopGalamseyNow, an Accra-based media-led campaign launched in April 2017 to raise public 
awareness of and lobby for action to be taken to eliminate unlicensed ASM activities, the NPP 
Government insisted that its ‘war against the galamsey‘ was solely about eradicating what it claimed 
was a ‘menace’ responsible for significant environmental degradation.  Professor Frimpong Boateng 
stressed that the government would not ‘retreat’ from its commitment to protecting the country’s 
water bodies and environment, adding that ‘if anybody thought we were joking, they should think 
again’.7 But to suggest that protecting the environment was the only reason behind the ban and the 
launch of Operation Vanguard is both misleading and unconvincing.  After briefly drawing on aspects 
of the resource curse literature to frame the case study, the paper traces the antecedents of the ban 
 
4 ‘Npp will regularize galamsey’, www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/NPP-will-regularize-
galamsey-Akufo-Addo-455652 (Accessed 12 November 2017). 
5 ‘I will put my Presidency on line to stop galamsey’, www.ghananewsagency.org/social/i-will-put-my-
presidency-on-line-to-stop-galamsey-president-119418 (Accessed 2 November 2017). 
6 ‘Military storms galamsey areas in special enforcement operation’, 
http://citifmonline.com/2017/07/31/military-storms-galamsey-areas-in-special-enforcement-operation/ 
(Accessed 3 November 2017). 
7 ‘Operation Vanguard launched to wipe out galamsey’, www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/operation-
vanguard-launched-to-wipe-out-galamsey.html (Accessed 17 August 2017). 
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and Operation Vanguard and weighs in on arguments used as justification for their launch.  It then 
offers more grounded explanations for these decisions. 
 
2. The Dynamics of Rent-Seeking in a Mining Space 
 
Recent developments in Ghana’s mining sector, including the ban itself, can be contextualized using 
the literature on the ‘resource curse’.  Although hotly debated, the resource curse thesis has, for 
decades, had significant influence as an explanation for why many developing countries have failed to 
harness their resource wealth to catalyze development (see for example, Sachs and Warner 1997); 
Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Ross, 2004, 2015, 2019; Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis, 2015; Van Der Ploeg 
and Poelhekke, 2016; Gilberthorpe and Rajak, 2016; Poncian, 2019). According to Rosser (2006), the 
resource curse literature has been situated within three broad subcategories that have focused on: 1) 
the relationship between resource wealth and economic performance; 2) the links between resources 
and violent conflict; and 3) the relationship between resource abundance and the nature of political 
regimes.   
 
Within the third subcategory, a case is now being made for the need for ‘good governance’ as a 
remedy for the resource curse in mineral-rich developing countries. Specifically, the ‘institutional 
strand’ of the debate (Hilson and Maconachie, 2008; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Doraisami, 2016) suggests 
that ‘weak institutions’ in these settings, and the responses and performance of governments that 
have access to sizable and steady streams of revenue from resource extraction, are at the heart of the 
problem. Ghana, with its buoyant democracy and ‘middle income developing country’ status, is not 
the most obvious example of a resource ‘cursed’ economy in mineral-rich sub-Saharan Africa and 
therefore tends to be overlooked in most regional assessments of the subject.   
 
Within the resource curse literature, Karl (1997, 1999) is often credited with initially advancing 
debates on ‘weak’ institutions in this context, or how the quality and malleability of a country’s 
governing structures impact the management of resource rents.  Focusing on petroleum dependence, 
the author argued that oil turns states into ‘honey pots’ which can fuel rent-seeking behaviour among 
many groups of actors.  Boutillier (2017) collated the work that has since been published on ‘weak’ 
institutions, identifying a host of elements associated with the problem, including complex 
bureaucracies, poor civil rights records, overlapping property regimes and an unbalanced rule of law.  
There is, of course, the more fundamental issue regularly overlooked in this discussion, which is 
whether states have the capacity to handle the excess revenue typically associated with natural 
resource booms, and the ability to regulate and monitor mining and/or oil production effectively.  
Ayee et al. (2011) sum up why both tasks are challenging in Ghana:  
 
Weak bureaucratic capacity prevents regulatory institutions from performing their functions 
effectively. This problem can be identified in almost all the MDAs [Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies], including the Ministry of Finance and the tax administration…Tackling poor 
regulatory capacity in this arena has not been a consistent priority. As a result, the mining 
industry is not being regulated effectively, essential analyses are not being undertaken, and 
most policy proposals are accepted without sufficient understanding of their implication. [p. 19] 
 
An additional concern in Ghana, the authors explain, is that it is has a ‘powerful executive president, 
strong party loyalty, a system of political patronage, and a lack of transparency’ (p. 6).  For Abdulai 
(2017), it is this attribute, specifically ‘Ghanaian society and the competitive clientelism that it 
produces’, that has ‘significantly undermined the effective utilisation of mining revenues for fostering 




This leads to a second point at the heart of the debate on the ‘institutional strand’ of the resource 
curse, which is the performance of governments, namely Sachs and Warner’s (1997) observation that 
‘easy riches lead to sloth’ (p. 4), a concern which several scholars have since broached.  This ‘sloth’ 
manifests differently, depending on the country.  In Ghana, it has played out as follows: initially, 
following an election, the winning party expends considerable effort repositioning itself to ensure it 
can continue extracting revenue from mining activity but showing little interest in managing the funds 
it collects prudently, and committing few resources to regulating and monitoring operations 
effectively.  This behaviour has been visible since the beginning of Ghana’s transition to democracy in 
the early-1990s, when the country’s gold mining sector began exhibiting signs of recovery following 
30 years of deterioration.  Since this time, successive governments have, after winning an election, 
swiftly and decisively taken whatever action has been necessary to maximize economic returns from 
the country’s sizable gold mining industry.  News of this behaviour is unlikely to come as a surprise to 
scholars who have examined at length how Ghana’s endemic clientelistic politics and patronage 
networks have fuelled rent-seeking behaviour in other sectors of the economy, in the process 
nourishing the country’s elite whilst simultaneously impeding national development.  But rather than 
embellishing on this point, this paper grapples with the more fundamental issues which underpin the 
‘institutional strand’ of the resource curse in this case.  These are: determining how the opportunity 
to rent-seek in Ghana’s gold mining sector has arisen, shedding light on what successive governments 
have done to put themselves in a position to do so, and explaining how a ban on ASM, Operation 
Vanguard and complementary moves made by the current regime to forcibly eradicate galamsey 
activity are linked to this pattern of behaviour. 
 
In Ghana, fresh opportunities to rent-seek were made possible by the series of changes ushered in by 
the Minerals and Mining Law (PNDCL 153), 1986 (Abdulai, 2017).  Key among these were the 
incentives introduced to lure foreign investors in a bid to revitalize the country’s large-scale gold 
mining economy: a lowered and standardized royalty rate of 3 percent on profits; a five-year tax 
holiday; generous rules on the repatriation of profits; and waived import duties on ‘mine equipment’ 
and supplies (Tsikata, 1997).  Jackson (1992) provided a glimpse of the early impact which the influx 
of investment stimulated by these changes had in Ghana’s major gold-producing areas, including the 
towns of Tarkwa and Obuasi.  These reforms would facilitate, during the period 1983-1998, investment 
of over US$4 billion in Ghana’s large-scale – mostly, gold – mining sector, including US$3.6 billion in 
exploration and prospecting.  At the turn of the century, there were 237 companies prospecting for 
gold (154 Ghanaian and 83 foreign) and 23 in possession of mining leases, investment from which 
netted the government US$79 million in revenue between 1996 and 1998 alone (Aryee, 2001).     
 
With such sizable quantities of revenue flowing into government coffers from gold mining activities, 
why has Ghana consistently scored so poorly on most social and economic indicators?  The likely 
explanation for its pedestrian pace of development, or what Sachs and Warner (1997) would consider 
a manifestation of ‘sloth’ behaviour in this case, is that since the country’s transition to democratic 
rule, successive governments have positioned themselves to maximize economic gains from gold 
mining and done little more.  As indicated, this pattern became quite visible towards the beginning of 
Ghana’s democratic rule.  In the early-1990s, the NDC Government, under the leadership of Jerry 
Rawlings, was perfectly situated to receive a steady stream of tax revenue from the mushrooming 
gold mine production and mineral exploration activity at the time.  Annual production of gold from 
large-scale mining more than quadrupled between 1990 and 2000, rising from 517,818 oz to 2,168,802 
oz, netting the government US$125.1 million in royalties alone during this period (Ghana Chamber of 
Mines, 2016). 
 
Alongside this, the NDC Government, with assistance from the World Bank through the US$12.3 
million Mining Sector Development and Environment Project, worked to curtail the smuggling of gold 
by positioning its Precious Minerals and Marketing Corporation (PMMC), the state buying agency, to 
7 
 
offer better prices to miners.  It also established a PMMC buying office in Tarkwa, a hub of ASM 
activity, as well as authorized Miramex, a private company, to purchase and export gold and compete 
with government buyers.  A fairly-comprehensive effort was made by the government to define a 
legalized ‘space’ for ASM and more importantly, to establish a culture of support for the sector’s 
operators.  With only 30,000 people projected by World Bank officials to be engaged in ASM at the 
time, these seemed to be achievable objectives.  To address these, the government used monies from 
the Mining Sector Development and Environment Project to undertake a series of tasks, including 
testing improved equipment and processing techniques (US$1.25 million), disseminating new 
technologies to operators (US$1.29 million) and enhancing the country’s geological database with a 
view toward delineating areas suitable for ASM to prospective licensees (World Bank, 1995).  Moves 
made to formalize and support ASM, and stem the smuggling of gold, paid immediate dividends: 
declared annual production increased nearly tenfold between 1990 and 2000, rising sharply from 
17,234 oz to 145,662 oz.  Whilst there has since been a raging debate in Ghana about how output 
from ASM is not taxed, having a network in place that is capable of capturing – in this case – the gold 
produced by operators is as significant an achievement because, as Hentschel et al (2002). explain, it 
(gold) ‘is more or less a standard “currency” the produced value [of which] is equivalent to extra 
foreign income’, and can, therefore, ‘be considered a net contribution to foreign income as freely 
convertible “currency” is produced with pure local input’ (p. 52).   
 
When Rawlings’ successor, the NPP’s John Kufuor, was elected president in 2000, the gold price was 
about to enter its fifth consecutive year under US$300/oz.  It was a time of immense uncertainty when, 
because of a series of mine closures and global consolidation of the industry, gold production was 
stagnating.  It had dipped 10 percent between 1999 and 2000 because of the closure of the Teberebie 
Mine and surface operations at Ashanti Goldfields’ Obuasi project.  The Kufuor Government correctly 
anticipated that large-scale gold mine production, which dipped from 2,358,423 oz in 1999 to 
1,783,400 oz in 2004,8 would continue to decline if the gold price remained low.  If it was to continue 
extracting sizable revenue from gold mining, it needed to quickly reposition itself in a space in which 
large-scale activities were no longer generating the finances they once did.   The Kufuor regime would 
accomplish this by making three very important moves.  The first was, alongside efforts to promote 
mineral exploration, the forging of a 15-year stabilization agreement with the US mining giant 
Newmont Gold Mining, which, through its acquisition of Normandy Mining Ltd. of Australia and 
Franco-Nevada Mining Corp. Ltd. of Canada, had gained control of properties at Ahafo in Ghana’s 
Brong-Ahafo Region and Akyem in its Eastern Region.   
 
The second was the role the government played in facilitating AngloGold’s acquisition of Ashanti 
Goldfields and the stabilization agreement forged with the resulting merged entity, AngloGold 
Ashanti.  On 18 February 2004, the NPP gained parliamentary approval for the controversial merger 
that attracted criticism from the rival NDC, which, in 1999, had rejected a US$800 million offer by 
Lonmin, a major shareholder in Ashanti Goldfields at the time, for a similar type of merger.  The 
government’s original 17.5 percent US$222 million stake in Ashanti Goldfields reduced to 2.4 percent 
after the merger, although it was given an additional 685,000 shares valued at US$100 million, which 
increased its ownership in the company to 3.4 percent.  The newly-merged company would be 
protected, for the next 15 years, by a stabilization agreement that diluted even further its 
responsibilities in this area.  It capped the operator’s royalty rate at 3 percent of total revenues and 
its corporate tax rate at 30 percent, and permitted it to hold between 60 and 80 percent of total 
earnings in offshore accounts (Coakley, 2003). The investments made by Newmont and AngloGold 
Ashanti would not impact production significantly until after the NPP’s departure in 2008.  Between 
2001 and 2008, the time in which the Kufuor Government was in office, annual large-scale gold mine 
production only increased slightly, from 2,184,313 oz to 2,378,012 oz.  But during this period, the 
government attracted, on the back of a new law, The Minerals and Mining Act, 2006, US$4.59 billion 
 
8 Data obtained from the Minerals Commission, Accra. 
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in new investment in the mining sector, including US$1.75 billion in exploration expenditure (Ghana 
Chamber of Mines, 2016).  The law very importantly capped the royalty rate at 3 percent of profits, as 
well as subsumed all legislation hitherto in place for small-scale mining.   
 
The third significant move made by the NPP to maximize economic gains from a gold mining sector in 
recovery was a commitment to purchasing output from ASM operators.  Using the institutional 
foundation laid by its predecessor, it went to significant lengths to ensure that, through PMMC, it was 
well-positioned to capture all gold being produced on an artisanal and small scale.  By the mid-2000s, 
there were 700 licensed PMMC buyers patrolling the country, purchasing gold mostly at the site level 
from ASM operators (Hilson and Pardie, 2006).   The rent-seeking element here, however, can be seen 
as the failure of the government to fully formalize ASM.  Specifically, rather than dismantling the 
bureaucracy associated with, and reducing the costs attached to, obtaining a Small-Scale Gold Mining 
License, and ignoring the broader needs of the sector, policymakers would prioritize the capturing of 
gold to such an extent that PMMC buyers would turn a blind eye on the masses of illegal activity, 
purchasing output from both licensed miners and galamsey operators.  Declared gold production from 
ASM rose nearly fourfold from the time the NPP arrived in office to its departure, increasing from 
145,662 oz in 2000 to 418,943 oz in 2008.  Most of the gold PMMC officials captured originated from 
illegal workings: by this time, there were an estimated 200,000-500,000 individuals employed directly 
in the sector (Carson et al., 2005; World Bank, 2008) but only 100 licensed operations.     
 
One of the more visible examples of ‘sloth’ behaviour took place during the NDC’s return to office.  
The party’s time in power, initially under the leadership of Atta Mills and subsequently, John Mahama, 
coincided with a period of extremely high gold prices.  The price was already trending upward at the 
time Atta Mills began his term, and by the end of 2009, his first year in office, it had reached 
US$1087.50/oz, peaking at US$1900/oz on 22 August 2011.  During the period of time the NDC was in 
office, 2009-2016, US$7.48 billion was injected into Ghana’s mining economy (Ghana Chamber of 
Mines, 2016), and to take advantage of ‘booming’ gold production (Figure 1), it passed the Mining 
(Amendment) Act, 2010 (Act 794), which increased the royalty rate from 3 to 5 percent, as well as 
flirted, in 2012, with the idea of implementing a 10 percent windfall tax.9  By this point, ASM activities 
were producing close to one third of the country’s gold; as was the case during the NPP’s reign, most 
of this originated from unlicensed workings.  With its comprehensive system of gold buying in place, 
the NDC Government seemed unfazed by calls to simplify and reduce the costs of licensing for ASM.  
In fact, and defying calls made by officials at the International Labour Organization for countries to 
commit to ‘simplifying registration procedures [for ASM]’ because ‘the regulations are so complex that 
small-scale miners are dissuaded from attempting to adhere to them’ (ILO, 1999, np), the Government 
of Ghana increased the costs, requiring prospective licensees to pay over US$1000 in miscellaneous 
fees.10  
 
With investment from large-scale mining companies continuing to rise, yielding US$1.85 billion in tax 
between 2011 and 2013, a time of record gold prices, and PMMC collecting 3,912,901 oz of gold from 
ASM operators during this period, the NDC Government probably did not see any need to improve 




9 ‘Ghana plans to reintroduce mining windfall tax’, www.iol.co.za/business-report/international/ghana-plans-to-
reintroduce-mining-windfall-tax-1609311 (Accessed 4 August 2017). 
10 Prospective licensees were required to pay, during the time of the NDC, in the range of US$512 to prepare a 
site plan; US$51 for an application form; US$128 as a processing fee; a US$282 ‘consideration’ fee; an estimated 
US$384 to the Environmental Protection Agency for the completion of an environmental impact assessment; 
and several other fees, including a stamp duty, court duties, and stool land registration (Hilson et al., 2014). 
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3. The Ban and Operation Vanguard: An Elaborate Pretext for Rent-Seeking?   
 
When Operation Vanguard was launched, government officials maintained that military intervention 
was needed to enforce a ban on ASM, a decision which they claim was made because the sector, in 
particular, galamsey activities, has a sizable environmental footprint and is populated by tens of 
thousands of Chinese ‘gold seekers’ who have introduced technologies (in particular, river dredges) 
that are causing significant damage to waterbodies.  These decisions were buoyed by the 
#StopGalamseyNow campaign, whose architects – employees at the Accra-based radio station CITI FM 
– skilfully used images of contaminated land and water degradation in ASM communities to galvanize 
support from influential NGOs, think-tanks, church organizations and the general public for a ban and 
military action.  Extensive campaigning in the streets of Accra yielded a lengthy list of signatures which 
CITI FM employees used to petition parliament to bring galamsey activities to a halt.  
 
This paper contests that the ban, and the government’s stated reasons for enacting and enforcing it, 
should be viewed as the latest phase in a decades-long pattern of rent-seeking linked to gold mining 
in Ghana.  At first, local media coverage of the ban, Operation Vanguard and the environment was 
extensive and unavoidable.  Developments around the country’s gold mining sector, including 
potential patterns of rent seeking behaviour, therefore, were overshadowed by the rhetoric around 
the galamsey ‘menace’.  The discussion that follows reflects more critically on these developments 
and more broadly, the impact of Operation Vanguard and rationale behind the ban on ASM, which 
was officially lifted on 17 December 2018.  The authors remain resolute in their convictions: that these 
decisions were less about protecting the environment and removing marauding Chinese gold 
‘seekers’, as was claimed at the time, and more about the government recalibrating to extract revenue 
from gold mining.  In addition to drawing attention to the timing of particular developments, selected 
mine data, press clips and excerpts from interviews are drawn upon in a bid to bolster these 
arguments.   
 




































































































































The rent-seeking dimension explored here has become exceptionally more nuanced, as the specific 
actions taken suggest a willingness on the part of government officials to deploy more creative tactics 
for personal gain, and to use engaging rhetoric wherever necessary and to showcase particular policy 
positions toward the sector to position themselves to secure additional funds.  The objective here is 
to not only stimulate further discussion about the ban and accompanying military intervention but 
more generally, debates on how what Hilson (2019) dubs a large-scale mining ‘bias’ and the rent-
seeking behaviour linked to it has hindered the formalization of, and implementation of support 
services for, ASM activities.  After briefly reviewing the environmental argument used to justify the 
ban and the launch of Operation Vanguard, alternative explanations for these decisions are provided. 
  
3.1 Moving beyond the Environmental Argument 
 
The #StopGalamseyNow campaign galvanized public interest in galamsey with extensive lobbying and 
engaging messages such as ‘Life is more Precious than Gold’, ‘Help End Galamsey now’, ‘Stop Illegal 
Mining’, ‘Think Right, Mine Right, Live Right’, ‘Value Life not Gold’, ‘Preserve our Water Bodies’, and 
‘Preserve our Rich Forests’ (Hilson, 2017).  Whilst it is true that mining is, by its very nature, an 
environmentally-destructive activity, the environmental argument, is, for several reasons, insufficient 
on its own in explaining the course of action taken by the NPP Government.   
 
First, environmental impacts are only a small aspect of the galamsey story.  In their public speeches, 
Ghana’s politicians avoid sharing what may be more important information about ASM which would 
provide a much fuller picture of the sector.  This includes how it is largely poverty-driven, creating 
employment opportunities for many millions of people both directly at sites and in ancillary trades, 
and how activities dovetail, and support, subsistence agriculture.  They also fail to explain why the 
country’s ASM sector has progressed along the environmentally-destructive path it has in the first 
place.  The reason for this is that most of its activities are found in the informal economy, where, 
without titles, operators come under the control of middlemen and chiefs.  In Ghana, it is mainly the 
bureaucratic policy framework in place for ASM that is responsible for fuelling the proliferation of 
environmentally-destructive galamsey activities.  
 
The second reason concerns the peculiar timing of the campaign (#StopGalamseyNow) and a military 
exercise (Operation Vanguard) built around the theme of environmental protection.  Whilst important 
and certainly in need of being tackled comprehensively, the environmental impacts of ASM have never 
elicited much of a response from Ghana’s policymakers in the past.  When this point was raised during 
an interview with one government official, the response given was that ‘it [the sector’s environmental 
impact] has become a matter of urgency now’.12  But this is an inadequate explanation for a problem 
which has been ‘a matter of urgency’ for more than two decades, repeatedly brought to the attention 
of Ghana’s policymakers and other African governments during this period by scholars and donors 
(e.g. Amonoo-Neizer et al., 1996; Bonzongo et al., 2003; Rajaee et al., 2015). The continued lack of 
interest shown by officials at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Ghana’s national 
environmental body, in regulating ASM activity is a telling indication of the low level of importance 
the country’s policymakers have attached to managing the environmental impacts of galamsey 
activities over the years.  Aside from implementing an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which 
is little more than a checklist, the EPA plays no role in the regulation and monitoring of ASM in the 
country.  This EIA has long been identified as a major reason why the licensing process for ASM in 
Ghana experiences so many protracted delays.  It is also costly, and despite concerns voiced in the 
ASM community about it being an expensive financial outlay, the government elected to increase the 
 
12 Interview, government official, Accra, 25 August 2018. 
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processing fee to US$3500.13  The cost and bureaucracy linked to the EIA, administered by an 
organization that has little to do with the regulation of ASM nor wants this responsibility, have, 
ironically, fuelled the growth of the galamsey sector which government officials alleged to be the 
impetus behind the ban and the launch of Operation Vanguard.  The list of officials includes Professor 
Frimpong-Boateng, the current Minister of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation. 
 
Finally, given where protection of the environment registers on the Government of Ghana’s agenda, 
to argue that pollution from galamsey activities was justification for the ban on ASM and associated 
military intervention is simply unconvincing.  It is even more inexplicable when the origins of, and 
support for, these actions is considered:14 Accra, which, in 2017, was the world’s most polluted city.15  
It specifically raises the question of why politicians and Ghana’s elite, who are unfamiliar with the 
organization and economic importance of ASM, would suddenly decide to combat, forcefully, 
perceived problems that persist many hundreds of kilometres away in rural areas of the country and 
which they barely understand the dynamics of, when there are far more pressing environmental 
concerns to tackle in their own backyards.  These include Accra’s air pollution and congestion;16 its 
‘open defecation problem’ due to 70 percent of residents not having ‘access to their own place of 
convenience’;17 and a waste management crisis brought about by a shortage of sanitation facilities, 
which are only able to treat 600 of the 2000 tonnes of garbage the city generates daily.18 
 
It is likely more of a case of the Government of Ghana recognizing that conveying the impression that 
implementation of a ban on ASM and how the deployment of police and the military to enforce it 
were necessary moves to protect the environment would position it to access other sources of finance.  
This appears to have been the case with the Global Environmental Facility, which, in support of 
Ghana’s ratification of the Minamata Convention on Mercury,19 catalyzed US$200,000 and 
US$555,250 to assist the government with developing a Minamata Conventional Initial Assessment 
and a National Action Plan for the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector, respectively.20  Whilst 
both projects were approved in 2016 or a full year before the official enactment of the ban, given the 
demands imposed on countries that ratify the convention, a comprehensive list of tasks which includes 
 
13 One government official interviewed (18 June 2018) was of the view that this fee increase was made because 
the EPA is unable to pay its own employees.   
14 Hilson, 2017. 
15 ‘Accra ranked as most polluted city on earth’,  www.pulse.com.gh/news/accra-ranked-as-most-polluted-city-
in-the-world-id5457261.html (Accessed 4 November 2017). 
16 ‘Gridlock in West Africa: Accra’s Troubled Attempts to Tackle Traffic Crisis, 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/nov/11/gridlock-west-africa-accra-troubled-attempts-tackle-
traffic-crisis (Accessed 12 October 2017). 
17 Open Defecation In Accra; Health And Environmental Implications‘, 
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Open-Defecation-In-Accra-Health-And-Environmental-
Implications-194499 (Accessed 13 November 2017). 
18 ‘More processing plants needed to treat waste’, http://citifmonlie.com/2017/11/13/more-processing-plants-
needed-to-treat-waste/ (Accessed 12 November 2017). 
19 The Minamata Convention is an international treaty, coordinated by the United Nations Environment 
Program, that addresses specific anthropogenic activities which contribute to mercury pollution (Hilson et al. 
2018). 
20 ‘National Action Plan on Mercury in the Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining Sector in Ghana’, 
www.thegef.org/project/national-action-plan-mercury-artisanal-and-small-scale-gold-mining-sector-ghana 
(Accessed 3 February 2019); ‘Development of a Minamata Convention Initial Assessment (MIA) for Ghana’, 
www.thegef.org/project/development-minamata-convention-initial-assessment-mia-ghana (Accessed 4 
February 2019).  It is also worth noting that the Executing Agency in both cases is the Ghana EPA, which, as 
noted, has never taken on a regulatory role in the ASM sector.  What is perhaps even more disconcerting is that 
all matters related to the Minamata Convention, including these two projects, are being managed by the EPA’s 
Chemicals Control and Management Centre, which has never handled any significant work related to mining, 
and not its Mining Department.  
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outlining steps to formalize ASM, it is unlikely that monies would have been released without the 
government showing that it was attempting to gain control of illegal ASM, which a suspension of 
activities and military intervention probably accomplished.  More importantly, these moves likely 
helped the government secure a combined US$8,715,696 in GEF project financing and catalyze 
US$66,050,000 in co-financing in support of the Reducing Environmental Health Risks in Artisanal Gold 
Mining and E-Waste in Ghana.  The project, which is one strand of the regional 60-month long 
Environmental Health and Pollution Management Program in Africa that was approved officially on 1 
May 2017, is being executed by the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology, which again, 
Professor Frimpong-Boateng heads.21  It has also likely encouraged other donor bodies which have 
already pledged significant funds in support of environmental projects in Ghana to commit additional 
finances.  The clearest example of this is the US$19.39 million Additional Financing for Ghana Forest 
Investment Program – Enhancing Natural Forest and Agroforest Landscapes Project under the Climate 
Investment Funds.  It was approved on 26 June 2018 and is being managed by the Ministry of Lands 
and Natural Resources and ‘dovetails with the [Government of Ghana’s] GoG’s wider efforts to control 
illegal ASM and mitigate its consequences’.22   
 
In summary, it appears that the decision to ban ASM because of its impact on the environment has 
helped many government departments in Ghana secure significant finance.  In addition, however, and 
as will be explained, it has helped the Government of Ghana reposition itself to extract revenue from 
gold mining.     
 
3.2  Losing Control of ASM? 
 
Between 2012 and 2013, the amount of gold collected from ASM operators had started to decline, 
dropping from 1,464,781 oz to 1,441,497 oz.  After experiencing a slight increase to 1,489,497 oz in 
2014, gold collected from ASM again dropped sharply to 1,025,671 oz in 2015.  The current NPP 
Government attributes this decline to a rise in smuggling, declaring, in 2016, that galamsey operators 
repatriated, illegally, US$7 billion in gold.24  Whilst likely an exaggeration, there is little disputing that 
an influx of ‘foreigners’ into the galamsey economy has altered the dynamics of PMMC’s purchasing 
significantly.  There are rumours of foreigners purchasing gold in local currency directly from galamsey 
sites and subsequently smuggling it out through their embassies.  It is the recent arrival of 50,000 
Chinese gold ‘seekers’, however, that has had had the greatest impact.  They have fast become the 
‘face’ of ASM in Ghana but for the wrong reasons (Crawford and Botchwey, 2017).   
 
Accounts of the rapid proliferation of Chinese operators in Ghana’s ASM communities, as well as the 
well-documented roundup of nationals, has triggered xenophobic reactions across the country.  But 
what was referred to as the ‘Chinese problem’25 by one official in an interview is largely the 
government’s creation.  Under Kufuor, the NPP Government permitted thousands of foreigners to 
register ‘services companies’ for mining; this continued under the subsequent NDC Government.  
Heading the pilgrimage were Chinese entrepreneurs, who quickly became a visible presence in 
Ghana’s major mining towns, including Tarkwa, Obuasi and Dunkwa as well as its major industrial 
 
21 ‘EHPMP – Environmental Health and Pollution Management Program in Africa’, 
www.thegef.org/project/ehpmp-environmental-health-and-pollution-management-program-africa (Accessed 3 
February 2019). 
22 ‘Additional Financing for Ghana Forest Investment Program – Enhancing Natural Forest and Agroforest 
Landscapes Project’ www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/projects/additional-financing-ghana-forest-investment-
program-enhancing-natural-forest-and (Accessed 13 February 2019). 
24 ‘Illegal miners smuggled $7bn worth of gold in 2016’, https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-
news/illegal-miners-smuggled-7bn-worth-of-gold-in-2016.html (Accessed 13 November 2017). 
25 Interview, government official, Accra, 25 August 2018. 
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centres, such as Suame (Kumasi) Magazine.26  As will be explained, it is the lack of interest shown by 
successive governments toward formalizing ASM that would stimulate the movement of Chinese gold 
seekers to sites en masse.  They now provide the crucial support services that the government has 
failed to make available to the country’s ASM operators, including those in possession of licenses 
(Hilson et al., 2014).   
 
The first Chinese gold ‘seekers’ entered Ghana ‘legally’, convincing the authorities they had ties to 
registered mine service companies. But once inside the country, many quickly relocated to galamsey 
sites.  Lost in the growing public condemnation of the environmental impact of galamsey activities 
and widespread documentation of growing Chinese participation in the sector is how these 
phenomena are linked to the sector’s informality.  Indeed, there is now a vast literature focusing on 
Chinese participation in Ghana’s gold mining economy (e.g. see Crawford and Botchwey, 2017; 
Crawford et al., 2016; Bach, 2014; Aidoo, 2016; Armah et al., 2013). However, much of this scholarship 
fails to take stock of the bigger picture. The latest addition to  this growing list of scholars is Tschakert 
(2016), who examines public perceptions of these Chinese ‘gold seekers’.  Whilst their vilification is, 
indeed, disconcerting, as the author suggests, it is superfluous when the more fundamental concern 
of why these individuals are found in abundance in Ghana’s galamsey camps altogether is taken into 
account.  What cannot be overlooked here is again, why the Chinese are found in such large numbers 
in the galamsey economy. Their presence and growing importance in this space are, as Hilson et al. 
(2014) explain, owed to the sector’s informality.  Had successive governments committed to 
formalizing and supporting ASM, galamsey communities would not be overridden with Chinese gold 
‘seekers’ today.  
 
Perhaps the most surprising views on the ‘Chinese problem’ have been those aired by Ghanaian 
government officials.  Most have condemned the growing presence of Chinese nationals in the 
country’s informal ASM sector, and more significantly, fail to recognize how the policies they have 
designed and/or endorsed have triggered this particular development.  The likely reasons for this are: 
1) that senior government officials have not made the connection, genuinely lacking knowledge of the 
dynamics of the galamsey economy; or 2) have simply chosen to ignore the importance of formalizing 
ASM, content with capturing gold from a quasi-illegal sector populated by both unlicensed and 
registered operators.  The strategy adopted by successive governments in Ghana over the past two 
decades suggest that it is more a case of the latter, with some moves predictably stifling the 
formalization of ASM and confining most operators to the galamsey economy.  It is not only the 
prohibitive fees attached to, and bureaucracy associated with, small-scale gold mining licenses that 
are fuelling this informality.  The root cause of the problem is an institutional setup, which, over the 
past two decades, has deemphasized the formalization of ASM and the dismantling of an 
administrative structure that at one time had delegated regulatory responsibilities for the sector 
among government departments fairly effectively.     
 
The latter commenced when senior executives at the Minerals Commission, the country’s mining 
policymaking body, elected not to replace the director of its Small-Scale Mining Division when he was 
transferred to the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources (then the Ministry of Lands, Forestry and 
Mines), in the capacity of a ministerial advisor, in 2004.  With the jobs of most of the Commission’s 
employees, including those based at field stations, being linked in some way to ASM, this has added 
to the bureaucracy, as each employee must now report to a different line manager.23 According to 
one government official, this move has left the ‘management [of the Commission] in chaos’.24  There 
was likely no incentive for the NPP Government in power between 2001 and 2008 to formalize ASM 
because numerous influential parties were deriving benefit from it remaining informal: at the one 
 
26 A major industrialized area in Ghana that employs an estimated 200,000 workers, across a host of workshops.  
23 Interview, NGO official, 20 November 2017 
24 Interview, government official, 13 October 2018. 
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extreme, through PMMC, the government was capturing a significant share of gold produced by 
galamsey operators, and at the other extreme, local-level actors, including politicians, policemen and 
the very chiefs who have voiced complaints about ASM degrading the environment, found themselves 
in a position to extract sizable bribes from operators, taking advantage of the lack of regulatory 
presence (Aidoo, 2016).25   
 
Significantly, however, the arrival of Chinese gold ‘seekers’ and other foreigners has potentially 
compromised the government’s ability to buy gold directly from galamsey operators.  The general 
public and those who endorsed Operation Vanguard and #StopGalamsey were largely unaware at the 
time that the government, through PMMC, had, for decades, been purchasing gold from unlicensed 
operators indiscriminately, in the process perpetuating and fortifying the informal ASM economy.  It 
was explained during several interviews with government officials that the sharp drop in the amount 
of gold collected from ASM operators by PMMC buyers between 2014 and 2015 was believed by 
senior policymakers to be the result of a galvanizing Chinese purchasing presence at the local level.  
Concerns over no longer being able to capture this gold, it was further explained by these officials, 
would ultimately become a major reason why a ban on ASM was considered. 
 
 
3.3 Large-Scale Mining: A Reset?  
Over the last two decades, governments in resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa have consistently 
prioritized large-scale mining in their development strategies.  Large-scale mechanized extraction has 
often been associated with progress and ‘modernization’, whilst artisanal operators have been 
ostracized and subjected to military ‘sweeps’.  In addition to Ghana, there have been sweeps 
conducted in a range of other locations, including the Marange diamond fields in Zimbabwe (Masiya 
and Benkenstein, 2012; Chipangura, 2019) and artisanal gold mining fields in Côte d'Ivoire (Van 
Bockstael, 2019). 
Recent research by Hilson et al. (2020) has explored how this large-scale bias is deeply-rooted in host 
governments’ desire to extract ‘easy money’ in the form of taxes, permit fees and exploration licences.  
Significantly, there seems to be a lengthy history of this bias in the region: there were early reports 
and anecdotal evidence of this behaviour surfacing over a decade ago in the likes of Tanzania (Lissu, 
2004; Lange, 2006), Liberia (Wallace and Lepol, 2008), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (World 
Bank, 2008).  In most cases, as Hilson (2019) notes, policies designed to bolster this bias towards large-
scale mine development allow governments to generate significant amounts of revenue, whilst at the 
same time marginalizing the ASM sector.  In Ghana, the NPP’s intentions to develop its large-scale 
mining sector were made clear under the Kufuor regime, as evidenced by the stabilization agreements 
negotiated with Newmont and AngloGold Ashanti.  The Akufo-Addo Government seems determined 
to cultivate further relationships with these, and other, international mining houses, as well as to 
fortify the country’s large-scale mineral exploration facility.   
The temptation to rent-seek from large-scale mining may be too great for the government.  In 2016, 
mining accounted for US$369.3 million, or 16 percent of all revenue collected by the Ghana Revenue 
Authority.26  The taxes and other fees paid by the holders of the 593 active reconnaissance and 
prospecting licenses, and quarterly royalty payments made by the country’s mine operators, are 
sources of continuous and sizable sums of money which, as one government official put it in an 
 
25 ‘Chiefs, politicians, others cited in BNI report on galamsey’, www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/May-
5th/chiefs-politicians-others-cited-in-bni-report-on-galamsey.php (Accessed 3 November 2017). 
26 ‘Mining investors want Ghana to remove taxes on exploration’, www.newsghana.com.gh/mining-investors-
want-ghana-to-remove-taxes-on-exploration/ (Accessed 12 November 2017). 
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interview, are available ‘for chopping’.27  This is, the official continued, ‘effortless money’ that can be 
accessed with minimal manoeuvring, and could explain why, shortly after the launch of Operation 
Vanguard, the government entered into an agreement with mining companies to ‘protect’ their sites 
from encroaching galamsey operators. Mr Amewu announced at the time that ‘The Chamber of Mines 
has signed an agreement with some companies in collaborations with the military for protection of 
their sites’, and that ‘What we want to do is to let the public know that these particular mine sites 
have been protected’.28  The government understands that competition for foreign investment in 
mineral exploration and extraction, particularly for gold, has stiffened dramatically in sub-Saharan 
Africa over the past two decades.  During the early years of the Kufuor regime, when gold prices were 
in the range of US$300/oz, Ghana’s only meaningful competition in the region outside of South Africa 
was Tanzania.  Today, however, because of a gold price that has exceeded US$1000/oz since 2009, 
there is competition from a range of countries.  The list includes neighbouring Mali, now Africa’s third-
largest gold producer, and Côte d'Ivoire, deemed the continent’s most appealing destination for mine 
investment (Jackson and Green, 2017).  For the current regime, protecting these investments, 
therefore, is paramount.  
  
Ghana received a much-needed boost on this front following publication of the Fraser Institute Annual 
Survey of Mining Companies 2016, which ranked it as the second most appealing destination for mine 
investment in Africa.29  This grade was awarded on the basis of the country’s political stability and 
robust policy framework, it having made strides in ameliorating its well-documented power 
generation problem, and diminished investor confidence in other mineral-rich destinations worldwide 
(KPMG, 2014).30  Maintaining and eventually increasing large-scale gold mine production hinges upon 
a buoyant mineral exploration facility.  A suspension of small-scale mining licenses, Operation 
Vanguard and complementary military intervention helped make this possible, clearing the path for 
ongoing and planned activity and helping the government continue building relationships with the 
holders of the country’s reconnaissance and prospecting licenses, and large-scale mining leases, to 
whom it has committed a large share of the country’s land (Tables 1 and 2).31  Headlining this list are 
corporate entities based in Canada, the location of the Toronto Stock Exchange, which lists 58 percent 
of the world’s mining companies.  The major Canadian gold mining companies currently operating in 
Ghana include Golden Star Resources (in possession of nine mining leases covering a combined 451.05 
km2, and 13 prospecting licenses covering a combined 4834.75 km2); Kinross Gold (holder of two 
mining leases covering a combined 106.33 km2, and 21 prospecting licenses covering a combined 
3384.23 km2); and Asanko Gold (two mining leases covering a combined 55.51 km2, and four 
prospecting licenses, covering a combined 284.13 km2) (Kwakyewah and Idemudia, 2017).  More than 
50 percent of the country’s foreign-owned concessions belong to Canadian companies.  The Canadian 
Government did not openly endorse Operation Vanguard and military sweeps, electing to be more 




27 Interview, Government Official, 21 November 2017. 
28 ‘Lands ministry names mining firms with military protection’, http://citifmonline.com/2017/07/11/lands-
ministry-names-mining-firms-with-military-protection/ (Accessed 3 November 2017). 
29 ‘Lands ministry names mining firms with military protection’, http://citifmonline.com/2017/07/11/lands-
ministry-names-mining-firms-with-military-protection/ (Accessed 3 November 2017). 
30 KPMG.  2014.  Ghana Country Mining Guide.  KPMG, Accra.  
31 Data obtained from the Minerals Commission, Accra. 
32 ‘Gov’t begins moves to reclaim galamsey lands in Kyebi’, https://citifmonline.com/2017/11/11/govt-begins-
moves-to-reclaim-galamsey-lands-in-kyebi/ (Accessed 13 November, 2017). 
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Table 1: Profile of large-scale mining activity in Ghana33 
 
Total number of concessions 592 
Total number of prospecting and reconnaissance licenses, 
Ghanaian companies 
296 
Total number of prospecting and reconnaissance licenses, 
foreign companies 
220 
Total number mining leases 76 
Total Area Ghana 238,538 km2 
Total territory under concession, Reconnaissance Licenses 
and Prospecting Licenses (Ghanaian companies) 
25,208.07 km2 
Total territory under concession, Reconnaissance Licenses 
and Prospecting Licenses (Foreign companies) - (includes 
offshore concession of 10,000 km2 awarded to Marine 
Mining Corp in Western Central Region). 
39,184.99 km2   
Total territory under concession, Mining Licenses 3,932.72 km2 
 
 
Table 2: Total area in Ghana under concession by region (km2)34 
Region Size (km2) Total area of covered by 
licenses (Reconnaissance + 
Prospecting + Mining),  
km2 
Ashanti 24,390 9,749.29 
Western/Ashanti  69.72 
Eastern/Ashanti  183.71 
Ashanti/Central  0.02  
Brong-Ahafo/Ashanti  377.45 
Brong-Ahafo 39,557 8,511.05 
Central 9,826 6,510.48 
Central/Western  10,442.03 
Central/Eastern  270.69 
Eastern 19,977 4,344.45 
Greater Accra 2,593 N/A 
Northern 70,383 4,620.98 
Western 23,921 12,825.15 
Upper East 8,842 5,067.92 
Upper West 18,477 4,912.47 
Volta 20,572 440.37 
 
The Government of Australia and Government of the United States, however, openly endorsed the 
ban and accompanying military intervention.  In the case of Australia, Mr Andrew Barnes, the country’s 
High Commissioner to Ghana, publicly declared, at the time of Operation Vanguard’s launch, that: 
 
 
33 Data obtained from Minerals Commission, Accra 
34 Data obtained from Minerals Commission, Accra. 
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The Australian government, through its embassy in Accra, is very supportive of Ghana 
government’s attempt to manage the galamsey. We understand that it is a significant problem 
for Ghana, for the environment, for health and safety, for the people involved in this industry. 
It is also bad for the economy because it is diverting a lot of the gold revenues out of Ghana 
without being appropriately taxed and it also makes the legitimate investments of mining 
companies much more difficult to work here and undermine the legitimate miners.35 
 
The statement should come as no surprise.  Australian companies have injected more than US$30 
billion into extractive projects across Africa to date. Ghana, which, according to the inaugural World 
Risk Report (Mining Journal, 2017), is a more appealing destination for mine investment than 
Australia’s own gold-rich Northern Territory, is a top destination for the country’s mining companies.  
The reference made by Mr Barnes to ‘legitimate investments of mining companies’ include Australian 
multinationals Perseus Mining and Endeavour Mining Corporation, which invested US$20 billion in 
Ghana to develop gold mines during the period 2011-12 alone.36  Mr Robert Jackson, the United States 
Ambassador to Ghana, also praised Operation Vanguard, endorsing, publicly, the Government of 
Ghana’s efforts to eradicate galamsey activity.  Mr Jackson stated that, ‘It is incumbent on 
stakeholders to let the community see the value of preserving the environment’, furthermore arguing, 
with reference to the Atewa Forest Reserve in the Eastern Region of the country, that ‘We need to 
have a sustainable programme that will conserve and preserve the environment for future 
generations’.37  This is, coincidentally, very close to Newmont’s Akyem project, which could explain 
the timing of Mr Jackson’s statement.  Denver-headquartered Newmont (now Newmont Goldcorp) is 
the largest US gold mining company, and has invested, to date, a combined US$3.2 billion in its Ahafo 
and Akyem projects, which account for 15 percent of the corporation’s global production.  Ironically, 
Newmont was accused of moving its operations into gazetted forest reserves during the initial 
developmental phase of its Akyem project (Hilson and Nyame, 2006).  
 
Mr Jackson’s actions come at a time when the media and government appear to be working diligently 
on another ‘sanitization’ campaign: to alter public perception of large-scale mining.  Despite its lengthy 
history of well-documented environmental and community-level impacts in Ghana, large-scale mining 
has barely been mentioned in a negative light since the launch of Operation Vanguard.  In fact, 
alongside the flood of media reports which condemn galamsey activities because of their impacts on 
the environment, there are numerous accounts which attempt to draw attention to the positive 
contributions being made by large-scale gold miners to Ghanaian society.  Examples include ‘Newmont 
Ghana names mining company of the year’,38 ‘Newmont builds accommodation for health workers’,39 
‘Teachers receive rewards from Gold Fields’,40 and ‘AngloGold constructs social centre for Bankyim 
community’.41  Messages such as these have helped to further legitimize the current government’s 
moves to promote large-scale gold mining. 
 
35 ‘Australian govt backs Ghana’s anti-galamsey fight, pledges support’, 
www.myjoyonline.com/politics/2017/april-14th/australian-govt-backs-ghanas-anti-galamsey-fight-pledges-
support.php (Accessed 13 November 2017). 
36 Endeavour Mining announced its intention to delist from the ASX on September 21, 2015. 
37 ‘US Embassy Committed to Help Ghana Protect its Environment’, 
www.peacefmonline.com/pages/local/news/201705/315050.php (Accessed 31 May 2017). 
38 ‘Newmont Ghana names mining company of the year’, http://www.miningne.ws/2017/11/13/newmont-
ghana-named-mining-company-of-the-year/ (Accessed 14 November 2017). 
39 ‘Newmont builds accommodation for health workers’, http://www.ghananewsagency.org/social/newmont-
builds-accommodation-for-health-workers-124947 (Accessed 14 November 2017). 
40 ‘Teachers receive rewards from Gold Fields’, https://www.modernghana.com/news/816456/teachers-
receive-rewards-from-gold-fields.html (Accessed 13 November 2017). 
41 ‘AngloGold Ashanti Constructs Social Centre for Bankyim Community’, 
http://www.ghananewsagency.org/social/anglogold-ashanti-constructs-social-centre-for-bankyim-community-




The ban and Operation Vanguard appear to be little more than the cornerstones of an elaborate rent-
seeking exercise linked to large-scale mining.  Whilst the government was suspending all ASM 
activities, development of large-scale mining activities continued, unimpeded: in 2017, the Minerals 
Commission awarded eight reconnaissance licenses, 25 prospecting licenses and three mining 
leases.42  The ban enabled the government to reset its mining agenda, helping to build on this work to 
pave the way for fresh large-scale exploration and mining works, in the process increasing the inflow 
of ‘effortless money’.  At the 2019 Mining Indaba, the largest gathering of mine investors in the world, 
President Akufo-Addo made very clear his government’s position on mining, post-ban.  In a speech, 
he felt the need to reiterate to the audience the government’s view, explaining that ‘We in Ghana 
have a big problem with a particularly dark side of mining. It has been leading to a dramatic 
degradation of our land and waterways’, furthermore claiming that ‘Now it has become a large scale 
and dangerous operation, mainly as the result of sophisticated equipment and material being brought 
into the field by foreign-controlled criminal syndicates’.43  He simultaneously reaffirmed the 
government’s view that large-scale resource extraction is vital, economically, for the African 
continent.  He seemingly felt compelled to exaggeratedly claim that ‘The value chain of mineral 
extraction has great potential for job-creation, and can form an essential basis for the transformation 
of economies around the continent’,44 despite the continent’s capital-intensive, export-based model 
of mining-led activities rarely yielding anything close to this. 
 
As a point of departure, it is instructive to revisit the environmental argument used by the government 
as justification for banning ASM.  At Indaba, Mr Akufo-Addo also stated Ghana’s intentions to develop 
other segments of its large-scale mining sector.  What he strategically avoided discussing after 
detailing the government’s plans to construct an aluminium smelter, and to develop the country’s 
manganese and iron ore deposits, however, was the US$15 billion deal forged with the Chinese to 
mine bauxite.  As part of this deal, the Government of Ghana has controversially released the Atewa 
Forest to the Government of China to mine, despite the millions of dollars provided to it by the World 
Bank to conserve the reserve.  Ironically, a main reason why World Bank recently released additional 
funds for this purpose was because ‘the pace of degradation associated with illegal mining (galamsey) 
has accelerated in recent years and this provides the rationale for the Additional Financing, which is 
in progress’.  Yet, the Government of Ghana has permitted the Chinese to engage in opencast bauxite 
mining in a forest reserve, a move which promises to cause significant environmental damage.  More 
importantly, in the context of the discussion presented in this paper, the move discredits further the 
stated rationale behind the ban on ASM and the launch of Operation Vanguard, and casts doubt on 




This paper has weighed in on the recent decision made in Ghana to ban ASM activity.  Buoyed by 
growing public concern over how the sector’s activities are damaging the environment, the 
Government of Ghana launched Operation Vanguard, a military-led intervention aimed at bringing to 
a standstill all unlicensed ASM activities in the country.  The government also suspended all active 
small-scale mining licenses at the time, which its officials claimed was necessary whilst it ‘sanitized’ 
the sector and eradicated what it would routinely refer to as a ‘menace’.   
 
 
42 Data obtained from the Minerals Commission. 
43 ‘Ghana’s Nana-Akufo Addo says war on illegal mining yields eco-dividends’, www.miningmx.com/special-
reports/mining-indaba/mining-indaba-2019/35851-ghanas-nana-akufo-addo-says-war-on-illegal-mining-yields-
eco-dividends/ (Accessed 9 February 2019). 
44 ‘Africa: ‘Mining Must Make Africa Prosperous Not Poor’ – President Akufo-Addo, 
https://allafrica.com/stories/201902060323.html (Accessed 17 February 2019). 
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The paper questions the government’s stated justification for the ban – that is, protection of the 
environment – and its decision to engage the military and police to enforce it.  It argues that Operation 
Vanguard, which was endorsed by the Ghanaian public and media, helped to mask what is believed 
here to have been the true objective of this intervention and the ban more generally: moves made by 
the government to position itself to continue extracting revenue directly from a booming gold mining 
sector.  This should come as no surprise, given how previous governments have done precisely the 
same.  The ban on ASM and Operation Vanguard, therefore, should not be seen as collective action 
taken to protect the environment from ‘a menace’ but rather the latest move made by a Ghanaian 
Government to rent-seek from a lucrative ‘space’. 
 
More broadly, the analysis in the paper contributes to the resource curse literature in sub-Saharan 
Africa,  adding nuance to the ‘institutional strand’ of the debate.  In exploring the ‘institutions are 
weak’ argument in detail, the analysis offers a glimpse of what happens when a government becomes 
fixated on a particular revenue stream, and the implications of the changes it initiates to facilitate this.  
The discussion has drawn on an analysis of media sources, mine investment and production data, and 
findings from selected semi-structured interviews conducted with policymakers in Accra to argue that 
the move to ban ASM was motivated by factors that go beyond merely wanting to tackle illegal 
activities because of their environmental impacts.  Based on the evidence presented, these moves 
appear to be little more than an elaborate façade by the government aimed at masquerading its 
efforts to reposition itself to capture revenue from a gold mining sector that has experienced 
significant organizational changes in recent years. 
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